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Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are 
commands to the citizen.  In a government of laws, existence of the 
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law 
scrupulously.  Our government is the potent, the omnipresent 
teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example.  Crime is contagious.  If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.1 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 17, 2011, a group of protesters set up camp in New 
York City’s privately-owned Zuccotti Park to protest America’s 
political and financial systems, the excesses of capitalism, and 
widening chasm between the very richest Americans, “The 1%,” and 
 
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Howard 
University School of Law.  The author thanks the organizers, participants, and 
members of a most wonderful 2012 Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh 
Colloquium.  Thanks also to Professor Alafair Burke for sharing her draft article, 
“Policing, Protesters, and Discretion,” which I had the pleasure of reading.  A special 
thank you to Sara Tam, Cooper-Walsh Colloquium Editor, whose unfailing and 
comprehensive assistance was greatly appreciated. 
 1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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the rest of the United States, “The 99%.”2  The protest not only 
caught the attention of millions across the country, but it also spread 
quickly to other American cities3 and across the globe.4  Occupy was 
lauded as an organic, diverse, grassroots, populist,5 anarchist,6 self-
governing, consensus-based,7 direct-action mini-utopian8 collective of 
collectives.  Not since the Great Depression has a group or individual 
captured the division in the American economic classes so vividly.  
Many repeated its pithy rallying cry—“We are The 99%!”— 
including celebrities, billionaire moguls, renowned musicians, award-
 
 2. See Brian Greene, How Occupy Wall Street Started and Spread, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/news/washington-whispers/articles/2011/ 
10/17/how-occupy-wall-street-started-and-spread; see also Andy Kroll, How Occupy 
Wall Street Really Started, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/10/occupy-wall-street-international-
origins. 
 3. At its height, Occupy spread to more than one hundred cities across the 
United States, including, inter alia, Atlanta, Berkeley, D.C., Denver, Houston, L.A., 
Oakland, Portland, and Seattle. See About, OCCUPYWALLSTREET, 
http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013).   
 4. At its height, Occupy is credited with “actions” in over 1,500 cities across the 
world. See id.  There is some understanding that the American Occupy Movement 
was a subsequent and interim stage of an earlier global agitation for change against 
the status quo. See, e.g., Kroll, supra note 2.  In particular, Kroll stated that members 
of the collective credited with initiating Occupy Wall Street identified as New 
Yorkers, as well as “Egyptians, Spaniards, Japanese, Greeks.  Some had played a part 
in the Arab Spring uprising; others had been involved in the protests catching fire 
across Europe. . . .  The group included . . . people who’d taken part in uprisings all 
over the world.” Id.  He further noted  
That international spirit would galvanize Occupy Wall Street, connecting it 
with the protests in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and Madrid’s Puerta del Sol, the 
heart of Spain’s populist uprising.  Just as a comic book about Martin 
Luther King Jr. and civil disobedience, translated into Arabic, taught 
Egyptians about the power of peaceful resistance, the lessons of Egypt, 
Greece, and Spain fused together in downtown Manhattan. 
Id. 
 5. See Adam Weinstein, “We Are the 99 Percent” Creators Revealed, MOTHER 
JONES (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/10/we-are-the-99-
percent-creators?page=2. 
 6. See David Graeber, Op-Ed, Occupy Wall Street’s Anarchist Roots, AL 
JAZEERA (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/ 
2011112872835904508.html.   
 7. About, OCCUPYWALLSTREET, http://occupywallst.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 
18, 2013).   
 8. See Alyssa Newcomb & Carlos Boettcher, Occupy Wall Street Anniversary 
Protests Dwarfed by Police Presence, ABC NEWS (Sept. 17, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/occupy-wall-street-anniversary-protests-dwarfed-police-
presence/story?id=17249773#.UNPgPm9ZWSo. 
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winning actors, entertainment tastemakers, and other members of 
The 1%.9 
One year later, however, Occupy seems nearly irrelevant.10  Its 
protests are no longer headlining newspapers or cable news features.11  
Instead, on its first “Occuversary,”12 Occupy “seems to have lost 
nearly of all its steam,”13 disappeared,14 and stalled.  It is as if the 
movement’s initial intensity was inversely proportionate to its 
ultimate legacy. 
 
 9. See, e.g., Brian Warner, The 10 Richest Celebrities Supporting Occupy Wall 
Street, CELEBRITY NET WORTH (Sept. 16, 2012), http://www.celebritynetworth.com/ 
articles/entertainment-articles/10-richest-celebrities-supporting-occupy-wall-street/ 
(naming and identifying the net worth of Occupy supporters such as Russell 
Simmons, Kanye West, Susan Sarandon, Michael Moore, Deepak Chopra, Yoko 
Ono, Russell Brand, and Roseanne Barr).  Billionaire Warren Buffet, ranked as the 
world’s third richest person, and his son also indicated support for Occupy. See 
Andrew Frye & Alan Bjergahttp, Buffet’s Son Defends Occupy Wall Street Protests, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-13/howard-
buffett-defends-occupy-wall-street-protests-to-make-things-happen-; see also Brent 
Bozell, Occupy’s Celebrity One Percent Backers, NEWSBUSTERS (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://newsbusters.org/blogs/brent-bozell/2012/01/03/bozell-column-occupys-
celebrity-one-percent-backers. 
 10. One writer’s sentiments are as follows: 
[T]he Occupy movement seems scattered and almost vestigial. . . .  Its 
numbers are small.  And while it continues to send up a flare or two from 
the socioeconomic front lines of the American commons, there is no lasting 
organization, no powerful network of tendons linking large-scale 
movements around the country, and no centered political message. 
Tom Watson, Occupy Wall Street’s Year: Three Outcomes for the History Books, 
FORBES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomwatson/2012/09/17/occupy-
wall-streets-year/. 
 11. News coverage of income inequality (an Occupy raison d’etre) increased five-
fold between September and November 2011. Dylan Byers, Occupy Wall Street Is 
Winning, POLITICO (Nov. 11, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ 
bensmith/1111/Occupy_Wall_Street_is_winning.html.  On November 14, 2011, when 
some of the larger encampments were evicted, Occupy-related stories accounted for 
approximately thirteen percent of total U.S. news media coverage. Jesse Holcomb, 
Biggest Week Yet for Occupy Wall Street Coverage, JOURNALISM.ORG (Nov. 20, 
2011), http://www.journalism.org/index_report/pej_news_coverage_index_november_ 
1420_2011. 
 12. See Bill Chappell, Occupy Wall Street Marks One-Year Anniversary; More 
Than 100 Arrested, NPR (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2012/09/17/161303439/occupy-wall-street-marks-one-year-anniversary-more-
than-100-arrested (identifying the “insiders” terminology for the first year).   
 13. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 10; see also Annie Gowen, A Year Later, 
Occupy Has Lost Its Oomph, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2012, at A7 (quoting Occupy 
“observer,” Howard Steven Friedman).   
 14. See, e.g., Howard Steven Friedman, Dear OWS: Y R U MIA?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 3, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/howard-steven-
friedman/occupy-wall-street_b_1850301.html. 
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Reports of Occupy’s death may be greatly exaggerated.15  Few, 
however, would dispute a grim prognosis.16  For all of the various 
causes that many commentators have emphasized,17 this Article 
submits that excessive use of force by the police remains one of the 
most significant, if not primary, causes of Occupy’s precipitous 
 
 15. See, e.g., Christopher Robbins, Thirty-One Groan-Inducing ‘Is Occupy 
Dead?’ Headlines from the Past Year, GOTHAMIST (Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://gothamist.com/2012/09/16/31_groan-inducing_is_occupy_dead_he.php 
(criticizing mainstream media reports of Occupy’s premature death—not even two 
full months after its inception); see also Kelley Vlahos, Occupying a Footnote to 
History, AM. CONSERVATIVE, (Sept. 19, 2012), www.theamericanconservative.com/ 
articles/occupying-a-footnote-to-history (criticizing corporate media outlets for 
announcing or questioning the relevancy, vitality, or quality of Occupy upon its one 
year anniversary).  Vlahos indicates that despite valid points regarding Occupy’s 
failing and difficulties, “some of the same corporate media now gurgling easy memes 
about why Occupy did not make a bigger anniversary splash this week are the ones 
who played a role in politicizing, and therefore marginalizing, the movement for 
easily-digestible public consumption.” Id.   
 16. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 14 (“You once had a powerful voice.  It was a 
strong voice, but not always clear.  Today you are conspicuously silent.  Regain that 
voice so you don’t lose this critical opportunity to move the political landscape . . . .”); 
see also Annie Gowen, Occupy Protestors Arrested in N.Y. on Anniversary of 
Movement, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-
15/local/35496743_1_protest-marches-financial-district-supporters (quoting an 
Occupy protester’s prediction that the one-year anniversary would provide “a sense 
of rekindling the old flame”).   
 17. One commentator laments the substance—or lack, thereof—of Occupy’s 
protests: 
There are no tangible results from the Occupy movement, with [sic] has 
been as much about self-expression and experiments in creating a new 
networked community as it has about public policy.  There are no real 
Occupy policy briefs, no legislation, no candidates.  And therefore, it’s fair 
to observe that nothing has really changed in terms of the middle class, the 
under-represented, the “99 percent” or however you’d define it. 
Watson, supra note 10.   
     Others critiqued Occupy’s cliquish nature.  “The movement wasn’t inclusive.  It 
was more like a social gathering.  The results were not exactly what I was looking 
for.” Gowen, supra note 16 (quoting special education teacher Christopher Bueker, 
who joined Occupy Cincinnati for three days before growing disillusioned with its 
“anger and resentment”).  Even the author of this Article weighed in on Occupy’s 
lack of inclusiveness and, therefore, legitimacy. See Lenese C. Herbert, O.P.P.: How 
“Occupy’s” Race-Based Privilege May Improve Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
for All, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 727, 730 (2012) (criticizing the  dearth of racial and 
ethnic diversity in Occupythat, in the short run, hurt its cause among certain 
Americans). 
     Others hint that timing, not substance, catapulted Occupy’s public profile. See, 
e.g., Watson, supra note 10 (claiming that Occupy happened to capture the spirit of 
recessionary resentment by accident, crediting Occupy with creating the eponymous 
“Brand of The 99 Percent”). 
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decline.18  Given that the Occupy demonstrations and their protesters 
were overwhelmingly non-violent, one might expect governmental 
response to have been muted and measured.  It was not.  When 
footage spread of University of California-Davis police Lieutenant 
John Pike pepper-spraying peacefully seated student protesters as if 
they were vermin, it shocked and outraged.19 
It got worse.  Jurisdictions deployed overwhelming police force to 
arrest Occupy protesters and close public fora—actions characterized 
by some as retaliatory—to prevent arrestees and their supporters 
from returning and recreating encampments.20  Aggressive 
encounters, violent arrests, midnight raids, and phalanxes of officers 
in state-of-the-art riot gear triggered shock and alarm. 
Much of the worst police abuses that were documented occurred in 
cities with some of the most professionally trained, sophisticated 
police forces.  For example, members of the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) were condemned for their use of force and 
other questionable conduct (such as obstruction of the press, 
 
 18. “Normal people like me weren’t able to go to anything and risk getting hit 
over the head and pepper sprayed.” Annie Gowen, A Year On, Occupy Movement 
Hunts for Ways to Stay Relevant, BEND BULL. (Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://www.bendbulletin.com/article/20120916/NEWS0107/209160400/ (quoting an 
Occupy protester’s fear of police violence, akin to the experiences of other Occupy 
encampments, as a reason for withdrawing from Kansas City Occupy).   
 19. See Huaou Yan, Occupy Wall Street and Police Accountability, HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. BLOG (Sept. 28, 2011, 10:37 PM), http://hlpronline.com/?p=6471 (citing as 
an iconic instance of excessive force against Occupy protesters the “pepper spray 
cop,” who purposely pepper-sprayed peaceful and calmly sitting, nonviolent 
protesters at the University of California who were blocking a campus walkway). 
 20. See, e.g., Henke v. Dep’t of the Interior, 842 F. Supp. 2d 54, 54 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(discussing National Park Service closing part of a Washington, D.C. park in response 
to Occupy D.C.); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-cv-03253-CMC, 2011 WL 
6698990, at *1–2 (D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011) (assessing Emergency Regulation 19.480 
which banned all camping and sleeping on State House grounds, promulgated in 
response to Occupy Columbia); Toni M. Massaro, Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez: Six Frames, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 569, 603–04 (2011) (discussing 
various forum closures intended to prevent disfavored expression); Sara Burnett, At 
Occupy Denver Protest, Crowds and Officers Thin as Morning Turns to Afternoon, 
DENVER POST (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_19112322  
(closing park and arresting Occupy Denver protesters while park opened during 
normal hours of operation); Errin Haines & Kate Brumback, Atlanta Closes Park 
After Protesters Arrested, ATLANTA TIMES-HERALD (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.times-herald.com/Local/Atlanta-closes-city-park-after-protesters-arrested 
(closing park indefinitely after police arrested Occupy Atlanta protesters); Press 
Release, City of Oakland, Cal., “Occupy Oakland” Wednesday Evening Update 
(Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://www2.oaklandnet.com/oakca/groups/ 
ceda/documents/pressrelease/oak031926.pdf  (closing park space via chain-link fence, 
post-removal of Occupy Oakland protesters who had violated curfew rules). 
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surveillance of peaceful political activity, and “kettling,” or corralling 
and trapping protesters).21  Similarly, the Oakland, California Police 
Department was swamped with over 1,000 use of force claims22 and 
subjected to a 120-page commissioned report that criticized its 
“outdated, dangerous, and ineffective” policing of Occupy Oakland 
protestors.23  The report included, inter alia, the compromised 
investigation of police use of force against Iraq war veteran and U.S. 
Marine, Scott Olsen, who was hospitalized in critical condition with a 
brain injury after an officer shot him in the head with a beanbag.24  
The report made sixty-eight policy, procedure, and training 
recommendations for improving the Oakland Police Department’s 
handling of future protests.25 
Initial responses to the use of force against Occupy encouraged 
protestors and their supporters.26  Use of force discourse was 
everywhere.27  Commentators condemned police use of force as 
 
 21. See Max Read, Police Corral, Arrest Protesters on Brooklyn Bridge, 
GAWKER (Oct. 1, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://gawker.com/5845775/police-corral-arrest-
occupy-wall-street-protesters-on-brooklyn-bridge (detailing NYPD efforts to tunnel 
and funnel protesters who attempted to march across the Brooklyn Bridge). 
 22. See, e.g., Ali Winston, OPD Screws Up Scott Olsen Investigation?, EAST BAY 
EXPRESS (June 13, 2012), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/ebx/opd-screws-up-scott-
olsen-investigation/Content?oid=3233648. 
 23. FRAZIER GROUP, LLC, INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OCCUPY OAKLAND 
RESPONSE OCTOBER 25, 2011, at 17 (2012), available at http://www2.oaklandnet.com/ 
oakca1/groups/cityadministrator/documents/webcontent/oak036236.pdf.   
 24. The October 25, 2011, report, entitled INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION OCCUPY 
OAKLAND RESPONSE, reviewed and analyzed “the morning and evening events of 
October 25, 2011.” Id. at 86.   
 25. Gavin Aronsen, Aggressive Police Response to Occupy Oakland Was 
‘Flawed’, MOTHER JONES (June 15, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
mojo/2012/06/occupy-oakland-police-response-report.  
 26. See, e.g., Joshua Holland, Caught on Camera: Ten Shockingly Violent Police 
Assaults on Occupy Protesters, ALTERNET, (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.alternet.org/ 
story/153134/caught_on_camera:_10_shockingly_violent_police_assaults_on_occupy_
protesters. 
 27. For example, international human rights and U.S. civil liberties experts at 
seven law school clinics across the United States formed the Protest and Assembly 
Rights Project to investigate the American response to Occupy Wall Street in light of 
the government’s international legal obligations. See generally SARAH KNUCKEY ET 
AL., SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO 
OCCUPY WALL STREET (2012), available at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/10/suppressingprotest.pdf (highlighting the need for broad police reform for all, 
accountability for violations, and rid departments of practices that undermine respect 
for civil liberties and human rights).  For a discussion of the report, see Colin 
Moynihan, Accusations of Police Misconduct Documented in Lawyers’ Report on 
Occupy Protests, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM (July 25, 2012, 11:06 AM), 
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“excessive,”28 “angry,”29 “overly aggressive if not altogether 
hysterical,”30 “heavy-handed,”31 and “grisly.”32  Early judicial 
decisions of police use of force during Occupy across the nation 
seemed largely to favor the Occupiers and their exercise of First 
Amendment rights.33  With documented, real-time witnessing of 
police violence and excess, there was a hope in some quarters that, 
finally, the larger American society would come to see what too often 
police are capable of doing to non-violent, peaceful individuals who 
merely are exercising their rights.  It was high time that other 
members of society not only see what happens at the hands of the 
police, but also experience it.  Despite the significant initial attention 
paid to departments’ policing of Occupy around the country, 
however, there remains no significant oversight or overhaul.  Modern 
law enforcement remains largely unchanged. 
In her essay Policing, Protestors, and Discretion,34 Professor Burke 
asks why—even if the law allows and given officer discretion—would 
officers police mass gatherings, rallies, and encampments connected 
with Occupy?  Why not leave the Occupy protestors alone?35  Use of 




 28. Watson, supra note 10.    
 29. Id. 
 30. Vlahos, supra note 15. 
 31. Aronsen, supra note 25 
 32. Nathan Schneider, Occupy, After Occupy, NATION (Sept. 24, 2012), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/169761/occupy-after-occupy#.    
 33. See, e.g., Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (D. Idaho 2012) (granting 
Occupy Boise’s motion to enjoin governmental dismantling of the protesters’ 
symbolic tent city as protected First Amendment expression); Mitchell v. City of New 
Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246 (D. Conn. 2012) (holding that Occupy protesters’ 
erecting tents, waving signage, chanting, and sleeping in encampments engaged in 
protected speech “in its purest form”). 
 34. Alafair Burke, Policing, Protestors, and Discretion, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
999 (2013).  
 35. Id. at 1002.  
 36. That officers may use force in their work is clear.  That officers should use 
force in their work may also be clear.  There is no requirement, however, that officers 
must use force in policing.  Peruse, for example, the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) website, located at http://www.nij.gov/about/welcome.htm.  NIJ describes itself 
as an agency of the U.S. Department of Justice dedicated to “improving knowledge 
and understanding of crime and justice issues through science.” About NIJ, NAT’L 
INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/about/welcome.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2013).  NIJ 
seeks to “reduce crime and promote justice.” Id.  NIJ’s policies clearly contemplate 
police use of force and advise it under varying sets of circumstances. Police Use of 
Force, NAT’L INST. JUST., http://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement/officer-safety/ 
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This Article discusses why it may be myopic to look at protestors’ 
expressive conduct during political demonstrations through the lens 
of the Fourth Amendment, as it may ignore or insufficiently protect 
protestors’ First Amendment speech.37  Expressive conduct that 
occurs in “high-crime areas” may best be understood “not as behavior 
indicative of criminality or a basis of criminal suspicion, but as the 
communication of protest, disaffection, or merely a simple desire to 
be let alone.”38  Nonetheless, officers are able to exercise their 
discretion to suppress expressive conduct by stripping it of its 
communication and translating it as criminally suspicious behavior.  
By allowing officers to “interpret” protest and dissent as criminal 
conduct, the Court legitimizes officer discretion as constitutionally 
 
use-of-force/welcome.htm (last updated Jan. 20, 2012).  Use of force is not mandated, 
however, even when an officer’s life is threatened. See The Use-of-Force Continuum, 
NAT’L INST. JUST. (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.nij.gov/nij/topics/law-enforcement/ 
officer-safety/use-of-force/continuum.htm (describing police officer use of force 
continuum).  This seems true, even when officer use of force is “justified, reasonable, 
and appropriate.” See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF 
POLICE, EMERGING USE OF FORCE ISSUES: BALANCING PUBLIC AND OFFICER SAFETY 
17–18 (2012), available at http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/EmergingUseof 
ForceIssues041612.pdf (explaining why use of force may be legitimate and not 
excessive, even if it exceeds that being used against the officer).  
 37. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 112 (2007).  
 38. Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive 
Conduct a Crime In High-Crime Areas, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 138 
(2002) (arguing similar challenges faced by expressive conduct in so-called “high-
crime areas”).  In that article, I registered a similar concern in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow, which held that that police could 
seize an individual in a so-called high-crime area who runs in reaction to and upon 
seeing police officers.  In applying the Fourth Amendment, the Court accepted 
without question or challenge officer characterization of flight as evidence of 
criminality. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).  The Court never 
considered the possibility that, under the circumstances, running in response to police 
presence was not an indication of criminality but, instead, protected First 
Amendment expression of, e.g., dissent or desire to be left alone.  I warned: 
When faced with a hostile and abusive governmental presence in their 
neighborhoods, those in so-called high-crime areas may flee as an expressive 
response to that presence.  Such conduct may be best understood not as 
behavior indicative of criminality or a basis of criminal suspicion, but as the 
communication of protest, disaffection, or merely a simple desire to be let 
alone.  
. . . [U]nreflective application of the decision in similar cases will foreclose 
individuals in high-crime areas from protesting nonverbally via reactive 
flight, notwithstanding their First Amendment right. . . .  [U]nreflective 
application [of the Fourth Amendment] will discourage individuals from 
exercising what may be the best means of communication available to them, 
even though their actions may be misunderstood. 
Herbert, supra, at 138–39. 
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reasonable while chilling speech that should, instead, be protected.39  
This Article suggests that until the Court closes the extant loophole 
regarding retaliatory officer conduct, modern law enforcement 
departments will continue to exploit it. 
I.  POLICE USE OF FORCE AND FOURTH AMENDMENT 
“REASONABLENESS” 
The Fourth Amendment regulates police conduct.40  It provides 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”41  A 
seizure occurs when a reasonable person (1) would not feel “free to 
leave” or (2) would not feel “free to decline the officers’ requests or 
otherwise terminate the encounter.”42  Under the Fourth 
Amendment, seizure of the person can occur via a full custodial arrest 
or an investigatory “stop.”43  The standard for arrest is probable 
cause, defined as “facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a 
prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was 
committing an offense.”44  This standard represents “a necessary 
accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty and the 
[government’s] duty to control crime.”45 
Governmental interests can also justify temporally “brief” seizures 
of the person on less than probable cause.46  Investigatory stops—
brief seizures—are governed by the Fourth Amendment and are 
lawful when justified by “reasonable suspicion.”47  Reasonable 
suspicion exists when an officer can “point to specific and articulable 
facts, which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.”48  In adopting this formulation, 
the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio49 emphasized the importance of 
 
 39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 40. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 369 (1974) (“[R]egulation of police behavior is what the fourth 
amendment is all about.”). 
 41. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  This Article only focuses on Fourth Amendment 
seizures, not Fourth Amendment searches. 
 42. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007). 
 43. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968). 
 44. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 45. Id. at 112.  
 46. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). 
 47. See id. at 20–21. 
 48. Id. at 21. 
 49. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
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balancing “the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which 
the search (or seizure) entails” to determine whether a search or 
seizure is lawful,50 as well as judging the officer’s conduct against an 
objective standard.51  An officer’s subjective, even malicious, intent is 
irrelevant to the evaluation of constitutionality of the stop.52 
Regardless of the reasonableness of the seizure (e.g., the officer 
actually did have probable cause that the person has committed or is 
committing a crime or that criminality is afoot), the Fourth 
Amendment requires that its manner of execution also be 
reasonable.53  If it is not, even a seizure lawful at its inception can 
violate the Fourth Amendment.54 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence long has recognized that the 
right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it 
the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to 
effect it.55  Determining whether the force used to effect a particular 
seizure is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful 
balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” against the countervailing 
governmental interests at stake.56  Under these circumstances, 
reasonableness requires careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the 
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 
arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.57  In a use-of-force case, 
the complainant’s allegation of excessive force will be judged under a 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry: whether the officers’ 
actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and 
 
 50. Id. at 21 (citations omitted). 
 51. See id.  
 52. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996) (holding a purported 
pretextual stop constitutionally valid because probable cause objectively existed and 
subjective motivations of police are irrelevant).  In Whren, the Court held that an 
automobile may be stopped “where the police have probable cause to believe that a 
traffic violation has occurred.” Id. at 810.  The actual motives of the police are 
irrelevant. 
 53. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly force 
to seize a fleeing, non-deadly criminal suspect is constitutionally unreasonable, 
notwithstanding probable cause to seize). 
 54. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984).  
 55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968).  
 56. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).   
 57. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9 (the question is “whether the totality of the 
circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . . seizure”). 
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circumstances confronting them.  An officer’s evil intentions will not 
make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable 
use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively 
unreasonable use of force constitutional.58 
Not all encounters between individuals and police, however, are 
seizures governed by the Fourth Amendment.59  The Court has made 
clear that  
“[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in 
the peace of a judge’s chambers” violates the Fourth Amendment.  
The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly 
evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.60   
Concepts regarding subjective officer intent “like ‘malice’ and 
‘sadism’ have no proper place in that inquiry.”61 
II.  PROTESTORS’ EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment provides, inter alia, that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”62  Expressive 
conduct is protected “to some extent” by the First Amendment, and 
is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.63  
Expressive conduct is behavior intended to be communicative and 
that, in context, would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be 
communicative.  These types of restrictions on expression—whether 
 
 58. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978). 
 59. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (finding no independent seizure 
when police asked about immigration status during questioning pursuant to search 
warrant); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 
177, 185 (2004) (holding no seizure when officers only ask for identification); United 
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002) (noting no Fourth Amendment seizure 
when officers question willing individuals in street or other public places); Florida v. 
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1984) (finding no seizure during routine interaction with 
police in airports because it is consensual and implicates no Fourth Amendment 
interest); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (noting not “every 
encounter between a police officer and a citizen is an intrusion requiring an objective 
justification”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“There is 
nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing questions to 
anyone on the streets.”). 
 60. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 399.  
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 63. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).   
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verbal or symbolized by conduct—are valid, so long as they “are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, . . . 
are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and 
. . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”64 
The First Amendment not only includes the right to express, but 
also the right to be free from retaliation by a public official for 
exercising that right.  Though “not expressly referred to in the 
Constitution, [retaliation] is nonetheless actionable because 
retaliatory actions may tend to chill individuals’ exercise of 
constitutional rights.”65  As non-verbal expression also involves 
conduct, however, “expression of this kind may be forbidden or 
regulated if the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the 
regulation is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental 
interest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
speech.”66  But once a State law, or the State’s enforcement of that 
law, targets and restricts certain speech because of its content—
especially when the target is political speech in a public forum—the 
law is presumptively unconstitutional.67  When the restriction is, in 
fact, content-based, the government bears an extraordinarily heavy 
burden of showing that the law or its enforcement is the least 
restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest.68 
Not every governmental action or restriction, however, sufficiently 
chills the exercise of First Amendment rights; not every restriction—
even if retaliatory—is actionable.69  A complainant alleging retaliation 
must demonstrate that the government’s actions adversely impacted 
his or her exercise of constitutional rights.70  Specifically, a 
complainant must demonstrate: 
 
 64. Id. (citations omitted).   
 65. ACLU of Md., Inc. v. Wicomico Cnty., Md., 999 F.2d 780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 66. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (citations omitted).   
 67. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010); see also R.A.V. v. 
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 68. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
 69. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Not every 
restriction is sufficient to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights, nor is every 
restriction actionable, even if retaliatory.”).  
 70. See Wicomico Cnty., 999 F.2d at 785 (“In order to state a retaliation claim, 
Appellees are required to show that WCDC’s actions adversely impacted these First 
Amendment rights.”).  
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1. That his or her speech was protected,71 
2. The alleged retaliation adversely affected the complainant’s 
constitutionally protected speech,72 and 
3. A causal relationship exists between his or her speech and the 
government’s retaliation.73 
Restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are analyzed under 
either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny, depending on the 
nature of the restriction.  Strict scrutiny requires the least restrictive 
means to achieve a “compelling” government interest; intermediate 
scrutiny requires a law to be “narrowly tailored” to a “significant 
government interest”74 and “leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”75  Laws and actions that do not survive the 
appropriate level of scrutiny are invalid. 
III.   HOW POLICE “SEE” WHAT OCCUPY IS SAYING 
The typical criminal defendant who attempts to protest 
objectionable policing and use of force is at a disadvantage.  These 
complainants are typically regarded as “high-crime people” who are 
denizens of “high-crime areas.”76  As a result, these typical 
 
 71. Cf. Huang v. Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C., 902 F.2d 1134, 1140 (4th Cir. 
1990). 
 72. See Wicomico County, 999 F.2d at 785 (“[A] showing of adversity is essential 
to any retaliation claim.”).  
 73. See Huang, 902 F.2d at 1140.  
 74. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 
(1983). 
 75. Id. at 45. 
 76. Ten years ago, I began to suspect that when officers used the term “high-
crime area,” 
[T]hey were not describing particular locations.  A high-crime area is a 
misnomer: areas do not commit crimes; people do.  Still, despite varying 
levels of police training, officers seemed to identify areas as “criminal” 
based on fixed, incontrovertible, and fairly obvious traits. 
     I suspected that the police were using a code language to suggest that 
their actions were justified because they were directed at “high-crime 
people”: poor, undereducated, black and brown males who live in . . . 
frequent depressed (e.g., culturally, educationally, socially, economically) 
inner-city neighborhoods or who look as if they do.  In practice, police have 
the implicit authorization to create and apply an inferior set of rights to 
individuals in high-crime areas, presumably because those individuals are 
regarded as being less worthy than other citizens.  The erosion of individual 
rights leaves people in high-crime areas unprotected and often requires a 
sub-citizen level of obeisance to those who patrol their streets.  
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complainants are “burdened with the understanding that they are 
‘more threatening, more dangerous, less remorseful, and more 
culpable,’ deserving of harsher treatment and less forgiving 
judgments in the eyes of their observers.”77  Though the Court 
proclaims, on one hand, that location, standing on its own, is never 
sufficient probable cause of criminality nor reasonable suspicion to 
believe that criminality is afoot,78 it also has held that location—when 
coupled with conduct—may be enough.79 
Additionally, the typical use-of-force complainant challenges the 
government’s unconstitutional conduct in the face of tangible, and 
perhaps substantial, evidence of his or her separate criminality that 
the government intends to introduce in a criminal prosecution (e.g., a 
gun, illegal narcotics).  Challenging police officer use of force grows 
even more daunting when there is tangible evidence of criminality.  
Try as many might, it is difficult to ignore evidence of crime when 
assessing the reasonableness of law enforcement’s conduct.  The 
Court’s jurisprudence manifests this challenge.  Initially, 
governmental unreasonableness in gaining evidence of criminality 
under the Fourth Amendment was regarded as a scourge, the taint 
and stain of which the Court was uninterested in approving.80  This 
 
     Once an area was accepted as high crime, judges sanctioned police tactics 
that would never be tolerated—much less court-sanctioned—in low- or no-
crime areas. 
Herbert, supra note 38, at 136. 
 77. Lenese Herbert, Othello Error: Facial Profiling, Privacy, and the Suppression 
of Dissent, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 99 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 78. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (“The fact that appellant was in a 
neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding 
that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.”).   
 79. Wardlow v. Illinois, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“An individual’s presence in an 
area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a 
reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime.”); id. at 
125 (“[I]t was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy narcotics 
trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon 
noticing the police.  Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is 
a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. . . .  Headlong flight—
wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative 
of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.” (citations omitted)); see also 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding officer has reasonable 
suspicion to stop driver the officer suspected was engaged in criminality because the 
driver traveled a road often used by illegal narcotics smugglers from Mexico and his 
passenger children, upon seeing the officer, waved in a “mechanical-like” fashion 
“for a full four to five minutes”). 
 80. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469–71 (1928) (discussing the 
“imperative of judicial integrity” as a reason to exclude illegally obtained evidence; 
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jurisprudential recoil birthed the exclusionary rule in criminal 
prosecutions.81  Increasingly, however, the Court began to elide the 
link between upholding governmental misconduct and its integrity.  
Today, the Court’s concern, seemingly, has vanished.82 
Occupy protestors, to their surprise, found themselves subjected to 
much of the same policing that the typical criminal defendant use-of-
force complainant who is criminally profiled experiences.  But 
Occupy protestors are not the typical criminal defendant use-of-force 
complainants; they are far from the “usual suspects.”83  In fact, 
compared to the typical victim of policing abuses, Occupy protesters 
are “blessed with a stunning array of privileges,”84 including but not 
limited to race-based privilege.85   
If Occupy protesters were so privileged, why did Occupy plaintiffs 
suffer much of the same policing “enjoyed” by the typical criminal 
defendant?  Perhaps it is because police successfully profiled the 
Occupiers.  As M. Chris Fabricant has noted, “In a law enforcement 
context, the perception of inherent criminality for disfavored groups 
serves as justification for collective punishment policies to deter 
 
courts should not ratify law enforcement’s unconstitutional actions by admitting 
wrongfully seized evidence). 
 81. “[T]the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct.” 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 
391–93 (1914)). 
 82. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1507–08 (1984) (citing the judicially-created exceptions to 
exclusion that, essentially, admit unconstitutionally acquired evidence of criminality). 
 83. “The typical complainant in an excessive force case is a criminal suspect from 
a poor, minority neighborhood, often with a criminal record—not a very credible 
witness in the eyes of the jury.” Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and 
Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 467–68 (2004).  
 84. See e.g., Peter Moskos, Which Side Are They On?, SLATE (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2011/11/occupy_wall_street_
and_the_cops_do_the_police_support_the_protests_.html (“Occupy protests 
complicate matters by bringing a segment of society—a white middle-class segment—
into, what is for many, first contact with police authority.  If you think of police as 
coming whenever you call for help, you may be surprised to learn that police do not 
work for you.  Officers work first for the police department and then for the city that 
pays them.  A force designed to maintain order and the status quo will never sing 
Kumbaya with protesters who combine a desire for change with a privileged sense of 
agency and entitlement.”). 
 85. “Because of this police perception, people of color have been targeted and 
disproportionately subjected to intrusive investigative scrutiny so much that the term 
‘racial profiling’ has become part of our national parlance.” Herbert, supra note 77, 
at 84. 
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criminal behavior viewed as endemic within the community.”86  This 
form of profiling relies on guilt by association and is very much like 
its counterpart, racial profiling.  So, for example, when it comes to 
racially profiled members of society: 
[d]iscrimination based on the perception of the shared 
characteristics of a minority group, such as young blacks and Latinos 
living in and around public housing, is a form of collective 
punishment.  Negative judgments are formed about the populations 
as a whole, based on characteristics that are perceived to be 
common among all group members.  Such stereotypes result in 
discriminatory policies directed at an individual “irrespective of 
whether she personally possesses those characteristics.87 
Similarly, with politically profiled protestors, discriminatory 
treatment based on the perception of shared characteristics is a form 
of collective punishment.  Negative judgments are formed about the 
protestors as a whole, based on characteristics that are perceived to 
be common among all of the protestors.  Such stereotypes result in 
discriminatory policies directed at an individual irrespective of 
whether the protester personally possesses those characteristics. 
Like racial profiling, political profiling occupies a unique place 
among such harmful practices because it presents several unique 
issues that make it difficult to address through standard police 
accountability measures.  Society entrusts law-enforcement officers 
with a wide-breadth of discretion in order to perform their everyday 
duties.  While the fast-paced nature of law enforcement necessitates 
discretion, if left unchecked, broad grants of discretion can lead 
police officers to abuse their position and engage in misconduct 
ranging from falsifying evidence, participating in violent excessive 
uses of force . . . .88 
One writer put it this way: 
[a]t its heart, Occupy was as much about free expression as it was 
about any tangible political goals.  And just as importantly, the 
reaction against Occupy—especially by the City of New York and 
the administration of Michael Bloomberg, was about containing that 
 
 86. M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding ‘Zero-
Tolerance’ Policing as a Form of Collective Punishment and Human Rights 
Violation, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 373, 387 (2011).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Kami Chavis Simmons, Beginning to End Racial Profiling: Definitive 
Solutions to an Elusive Problem, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 28 
(2011).   
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free expression—and quite frankly, limiting the constitutional 
guarantees to speech and free assembly.89 
One of the greatest difficulties with profiling is that its elusiveness 
evades detection.  Police departments have not only become 
increasingly militarized, but also zero-tolerance trained, which spawns 
harsh and indiscriminate tactics to “combat” perceived wrongdoers.  
Professional policing—as opposed to community policing—involves 
“rapid response,” “mastering sophisticated weaponry, and pledging 
loyalty to the organization,” which involves distancing oneself from—
versus collaborating with—those who are policed.90  Law enforcement 
culture of this type seeks not to understand, but to punish 
noncompliance and demand submission.91  This is so irrespective of 
whether the “non-compliance” constitutes an exercise of one’s 
constitutionally protected rights. 
Here, police practices of seizing the protestor—purportedly to 
ferret out criminality—and using force to do so demonstrate that the 
potential for governmental reprisal and retaliation via law 
enforcement’s (mis)use of the Fourth Amendment is great.92  Such a 
seizure may, itself, communicate to the protestor that the government 
“sees” what the protestor is saying and does not approve.  This  type 
of policing political protest not only constitutes “a potent means of 
inhibiting speech”93 for all so seized, but also threatens to inhibit 
exercise of the freedom of speech by onlookers.94 
The Supreme Court has never recognized a First Amendment right 
to be free from a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable 
cause.95  Law enforcement personnel and other governmental officials 
“who [were] perhaps overly fearful and intolerant of civil unrest and 
 
 89. Watson, supra note 10 (characterizing Occupy’s force as one that “came in 
like a lion and eased out like a lamb”). 
 90. Christopher Stone, Police Need a New Professionalism (Fortunately, It’s 
Already Hiding Inside Many Agencies, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (July 24, 2012), 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/police-need-new-professionalism-
fortunately-it-s-already-hiding-inside-many-agencies (assessing why police 
departments around the world are facing all-time lows regarding reputation).  
 91. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Who’s the Man?: Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, 
and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 697 (2009) (discussing how 
police may force those policed to acknowledge their respective statuses, “while 
ostensibly merely performing their duties”). 
 92. Herbert, supra note 38, at 139. 
 93. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 
563, 574 (1968).   
 94. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998). 
 95. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). 
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disobedience,”96 and who did not care for Occupy’s message could 
have silenced it under the auspices of Fourth Amendment policing by 
focusing on the conduct.  Such a “translation” of the expressive 
conduct allows the government to “produce a result which [it] could 
not command directly.”97  Thus, if the officer presents evidence that 
supports either an investigatory stop or arrest, “such evidence could 
be thought similarly fatal to a plaintiff’s claim that animus caused his 
arrest.”98  Accordingly, under the Court’s current jurisprudence, an 
officer might harbor content-based animus but “decide”—via 
stripping the conduct of its communication (or interpreting it as 
“criminal”)—to arrest the protestor because his or her conduct 
provides evidence that a crime or criminality is afoot.99 
This point should not be missed.  The Occupy Movement was and 
remains a political protest of income inequality, making clear that 
true power “resides within the ranks of our capitalistic society’s 
wealthy corporate oligarchy.”100  An example of this point is in order.  
The NYPD has received a considerable amount of money from the 
very banks that the protesters are targeting.101  JP Morgan Chase 
alone donated $4.6 million to the NYPD—an “unprecedented” gift—
rumored to have occurred on the eve of the department’s violent 
October 2011 surprise eviction of Occupy protesters from Zuccotti 
Park.102  Goldman Sachs, Barclays Capital, Jefferies & Company, and 
Bank of America have also donated large sums of money to the 
NYPD, the very police department violently policing Occupy Wall 
Street protesters.103 
 
 96. Trina Jones, Occupying America: Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., The American 
Dream and the Challenge of Socio-Economic Equality, 57 VILL. L. REV. 339, 344 
(2012). 
 97. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 98. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2095. 
 99. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 612–13 (1985). 
 100. Herbert, supra note 17, at 741 n.71 (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) for the proposition that when corporations exercise 
their First Amendment rights, they can “lavish money on police departments,” 
thereby purchasing political power and “personhood” that trumps even massive 
numbers of political protesters).   
 101. Justin Elliott, The NYPD, Now Sponsored by Wall Street, SALON (Oct. 7, 
2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/10/07/the_nypd_now_sponsored_by_wall_street. 
 102. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Buys NYPD for 4.6 Million, DAILY KOS (Oct. 2, 2011), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/10/02/1022031/-JP-Morgan-buys-NYPD-for-4-6-
million. 
 103. Though officers are typically regarded as blue-collar or working class and 
would, at first blush, be regarded as natural Occupy allies and supporters, it seems 
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As it turns out, that specific version of the rumor is not quite 
correct; the timing has been reported as coincidental and not in 
response to Occupy.104  But Wall Street finance firms reportedly have 
donated millions of dollars into the NYPD in an arrangement that 
critics say compromises the Department’s law enforcement 
legitimacy.105  Simultaneously, like other criminally profiled 
populations and locations, the Occupiers and their encampments 
were maligned in popular media, transforming the generally “high-
speech areas” occupied into “high-crime areas.”  Law enforcement 
co-signed the transformations, citing a barrage of alleged violations to 
support their reasonableness in policing these “high-crime people” in 
their “high-crime areas” so aggressively. 
CONCLUSION 
Some had hoped that the Occupiers’ experiences with the police 
would bring to the public the understanding that “[s]quelching civil 
unrest with official violence is a textbook tactic of American law 
enforcement agencies.”106  Some had also hoped that in virtually every 
Occupy city, but especially in cities like New York City, the Occupiers 
would be more sophisticated in their understanding that police use of 
force against their members mirrors the longstanding, well-
documented history of that same force being used against disfavored, 
 
that they were not and, instead, were avid supporters of The 1%.  It is possible that 
individuals who see conflict between the classes think that anger toward the rich is 
misdirected.  In a January 2012 report, the Pew Research Center found that a 
significant percentage of Americans believe that most rich people “are wealthy 
mainly because they know the right people or were born into wealthy families.” Rich 
Morin, Rising Share of Americans See Conflict Between Rich and Poor, PEW RES. 
CENTER 3 (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/01/ 
Rich_vs_poor-final_1-10-13.pdf.  Similarly, “overwhelming majorities of self-
described middle- and lower-class Americans say they admire people who get rich by 
working hard (92% and 84%, respectively).” Kim Parker, Yes, The Rich Are 
Different, PEW RES. CENTER 1 (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 
files/2012/08/sdt-rich-poor-082712.pdf.  About 43% say that rich people are more 
likely than average Americans to be intelligent and 42% say rich people are more 
likely than average Americans to be hardworking. Id. at 3. 
 104. Elliott, supra note 101. 
 105. “This gift is especially disturbing to us because it creates the appearance that 
there is an entrenched dynamic of the police protecting corporate interests rather 
than protecting the First Amendment rights of the people. . . .  They’ve essentially 
turned the financial district into a militarized zone.” Id. (quoting Heidi Boghosian, 
National Lawyers Guild). 
 106. Herbert, supra note 17, at 748 nn.106–11. 
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criminally profiled communities of color, specifically Black and 
Latino, that are often (but not always) poor. 107 
Perhaps I, like others, unfairly expected far too much for such a 
young movement.108  Occupy Wall Street may or may not have 
changed the world, but it is nevertheless remarkable that Occupy was 
able to change the economic conversation in such a short time, as well 
as begin the conversation of social equality.  There remains support 
for Occupy, which rightly recognized that the causes of the economic 
meltdown of 2008 were systemic inequality and the failures of our 
representative democracy.  If there is any chance that there might 
come a new day in law enforcement, thanks to the inroads Occupy 
has made, may the movement be instrumental in the ushering in of 
that new day and way.  In fact, those of us who support Occupy hope 
that they ultimately return renewed, prepared to retake the 
movement’s raison d’être, as they remain as relevant today as they 
were on September 17, 2011.109 
 
 107. According to statistics cited by the NYPD and the Center for Constitutional 
Rights, “[l]ast year, city police officers stopped nearly 686,000 people, 84 percent of 
them [B]lack or Latino.  The vast majority—88 percent of the stops—led to neither 
an arrest nor a summons.” Wendy Ruderman, Rude or Polite, City’s Officers Leave 
Raw Feelings in Stops, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/06/27/nyregion/new-york-police-leave-raw-feelings-in-stops.html.   
 108. See Jones, supra note 96, at 352. 
 109. See Nick Pinto, Occupy Wall Street’s Anniversary, VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 18, 
2012, 4:26 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2012/09/occupy_wall_ 
str_58.php.   
